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Abstract:  
This paper evaluates the impacts of globalization on quality of life, particularly on human 
development, gender development and human poverty in developing countries. Applying the 
fixed effect model to the annual panel data of 124 developing countries covering nine years 
from 1997, it shows that globalization (in terms of its comprehensive indexes and key 
elements) not only promotes human and gender development, but also significantly reduces 
human poverty. Not surprisingly, all the three aspects of globalization (economic, social and 
political) contribute to the overall effect of globalization. In general, the results from the key 
elements of globalization are consistent with the results from the comprehensive indexes. 
However, it is also observed that political and social globalization, FDI, and international 
migration were insignificant to gender-related development. Thus, further research is suggested 
for appropriate policy recommendations to make these variables significant on promoting 
gender aspects of development. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to its ever-accelerating trend, globalization has been one of the most closely observed 
processes among scholars, policymakers, politicians and even the general public in recent years 
(Collier and Gunning 2008, 1-2). Consequently, scholars have devoted their efforts to 
analyzing the impacts of globalization on different aspects of human life and society. Their 
arguments are, however, highly contested in terms of impact mechanisms and the gainers and 
losers of globalization. Some are quite critical as they observe the negative effect of 
globalization on QOL and society in the form of job elimination, especially in the 
manufacturing sector (Scott, 2001). These “hyperglobalists” argue that globalization is creating 
a new era of human history in which nation-states and governments are powerless to improve 
the quality of life of their citizens (e.g., Guillen, 2001; Soros, 2000). In their view, globalization 
is a great threat to society and they strongly oppose a globalized world. 
In contrast, many others observe the positive impact of globalization on QOL (e.g., 
Thorbecke and Eigen-Zucchi, 2002). For these “pro-globalists,” trade liberalization and 
increased marketing integration are opportunities to increase productivity and wages, which 
lead to improved QOL of workers (Zoellick, 2001). They claim that the negative impact of 
globalization, such as the elimination of manufacturing jobs, is highly overstated and the 
decline of the manufacturing industry is the result of rapid changes in technology rather than 
globalization (Krugman, 1996). 
In the debate on the possible consequences of globalization, non-economists generally 
tend to oppose globalization as they expect the costs associated with globalization to exceed 
its benefits, particularly in developing countries. On the contrary, supported by a number of 
empirical studies, most economists strongly believe the net effect of globalization is positive 
(Dreher, 2006:1091). Although Sirgy et al. (2004) and Tsai (2007) have investigated this 
question by assessing globalization’s effects on human and social aspects of development, 
their efforts are still exploratory and further empirical examinations are necessary. This paper 
attempts to contribute to the study of globalization with an empirical analysis that tests the 
theories proposed by earlier research, with a focus on the human aspects of development. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines the variables and explains its linkages 
with recent trends. Section 3 discusses the methodology employed, the data used and the 
variables analyzed. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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2. GLOBALIZATION AND QOL: DEFINITION, TRENDS AND LINKAGES 
Most empirical studies related to the so-called third wave of globalization1
These detailed studies, however, failed to consider the overall effect of globalization, as 
they focused on individual sub-dimensions. As all the dimensions of globalization are strongly 
related and are important in explaining the consequences of globalization, omitting important 
variables from the regression equation can generate severely biased estimates (Dreher, 2006). 
In addition, most of these studies, motivated by conventional wisdom, focus solely on 
economic growth, income poverty and income inequality (ibid). To avoid these shortcomings, 
this study intends to use QOL indicators as dependent variables and a comprehensive indicator 
of globalization, along with its major elements, as explanatory variables. 
 employ proxies, 
such as trade, capital flows and openness as measures of globalization using cross-section data 
(Dreher, 2006). For example, Heinemann (2000) shows that more globalized countries have 
lower increments in government outlays and taxes and lower government consumption. Rodrik 
(1998) also used cross-sectional data and found no effects of capital that account for openness 
in economic growth. Recently, however, some scholars have used panel data to find the effects 
of globalization and showed positive impacts of openness on growth and poverty but mixed 
impacts on income inequality (Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Greenaway et al., 1999). 
2.1 Globalization 
Globalization is a highly contested concept that means different things to different people 
(Bardhan, 2006), raising both positive and negative emotions in different groups and circles 
(Scholte, 2005). Consequently, development practitioners and scholars mostly refrain from 
explicitly defining globalization, and rather vaguely interpret it as real cross-border interactions 
and exchanges (Goldin and Reinert, 2007:2). In the literature, globalization is mostly viewed in 
economic terms. However, we cannot ignore its social and political dimensions, which are 
usually not considered properly. In fact, cross-national connections are created in the economic, 
political, cultural, social, and environmental domains.  
Measuring these variables into a single indicator is a major challenge in empirical work. 
In fact, if any concept can be expressed in numbers, it gives more meaning than explanation. 
                                                   
1 According to Martell (2007), “some recent contributions in globalization literature have identified three waves or 
perspectives in globalization theory—the globalists, skeptics, and transformationalists or post-skeptics (for details 
see Held et al. 1999; Holton 2005).” 
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Because of its inevitability in empirical research, a number of composite indicators have been 
developed recently. Constructing such composite indicators has made a significant contribution 
to globalization research, which is making it possible to consider a wide range of issues of 
globalization in scholarly works. Although using such composite indexes has its own 
limitations, the development of a composite indicator is essential to globalization research due 
to the complexity and comprehensibility of issues involved. Of course, one should be careful 
when using and interpreting results from such composite indexes. Particularly, conclusions 
cannot be generalized from such composite indexes for particular sectors or issues, as the 
results always come from combined effects. Keeping these points in mind, this study uses the 
KOF index of globalization developed by Axel Dreher (2006), which is considered one of the 
most comprehensive indicators of globalization. 
To define globalization, Dreher followed the explanations of Clark (2000), Norris (2000), and 
Keohane and Nye (2000:4). He summarized that “globalization is meant to describe the process 
of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated 
through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. 
Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national 
economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual 
interdependence” (Dreher, 2006:1092). 
More specifically, Dreher summarized the definition of the KOF index in the following 
three dimensions. Firstly, “economic globalization,” which is measured by the long-distance 
flow of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany 
market exchanges. Secondly, “social globalization” is defined as the spread of ideas, 
information, images and people, which is measured by personal contacts, information flows 
and cultural proximity. Finally, “political globalization” is defined as the level of diffusion of 
government policies, which is proxy by the number of embassies and high commissions in a 
country and, the number of international organizations to which the country is a member and 
the number of UN peace missions a country participated in. To construct the indices of 
globalization, Dreher transformed each of 24 variables under the above categories to an index 
on a scale of one to 100, where 100 is the maximum value for a specific variable over the 
period 1970 to 2007, and one is the minimum value. Higher values denote greater globalization. 
For detail see Dreher (2006). 
Following the definition and measurement of globalization in terms of KOF indexes, 
Figure 1 presents the comparative trends of the three types of globalization from 1970 to 2007. 
 6 
As expected, economic globalization is the strongest of the three factors. In fact, most literature 
considers economic indicators as a proxy of globalization. This is not only because of data 
availability and the clarity of economic indicators, but also because of its influence in global 
integration. Figure 1 also shows that economic globalization has the steadiest trend, without 
much fluctuation. Even during the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998), the trend did not drop 
sharply. To observe the effect of the current global financial crisis, however, we do not yet 
have data. 
Figure 1 Global Trend of Overall Globalization and Its Sub-Indexes (1970-2007) 
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Source: Calculations done by the author based on data from Dreher (2006).  
Updated data can be found at: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ (accessed May 5, 2010). 
Representing the high turmoil in international security as well as the increasing role of 
global governance, political globalization fluctuates more. Interestingly, political globalization 
shows much more of a contribution to the overall globalization trend than social globalization. 
Social globalization, on the other hand, is continuously the lowest of all trend lines. However, 
its progress goes along with the pace of other forms of globalization.  
Interestingly, globalization has moved faster since the beginning of the 1990s. This can 
 7 
be explained by the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, which lead to the opening of many 
countries in Eastern Europe, Russia and the states that emerged after the collapse of Soviet 
Union, and many other developing countries. The dramatic increase of political globalization 
since 1990 has contributed much to the accelerating globalization process. 
To complement the analysis from the KOF index, this study considers some of the real 
variables of globalization in a regression analysis. This not only provides an understanding 
about the relationships between such key elements of globalization and QOL, but also checks 
the consistency of the results that ultimately enhance the reliability of the study. The selection 
of the key globalization variables was based on the existing literature in the sense that the most 
proxy variables for globalization were considered. Therefore, this study uses international trade, 
FDI, ICT and international migration for its disaggregated analysis. The comparative trends of 
these key elements of globalization between DCs and the world are shown in Figure 2 on its 
four parts (2a-2d). 
Figure 2(a) shows the comparative trend of international trade between DCs and the 
world from 1970 to 2007. Interestingly, the trends not only reveal that the trade to GDP ratio is 
increasing sharply in DCs and the world, but also that international trade has become more and 
more important for developing countries in recent decades. Figure 2(b) shows the comparative 
trends of FDI inflows in percentage of GDP for both the world and DCs from 1970 to 2007, 
which reveals that FDI inflows in DCs are less volatile than that of the world. The FDI inflow 
to GDP ratio has continued to increase since 1990 for both DCs and the world. Again, the 
fluctuation in the world’s trend is mostly consistent with the trend of DCs in terms of time and 
direction. However, in terms of magnitude, the world trend has fluctuated sharply in recent 
years. See the World Investment Reports (WIRs) of 2001 and 2002 of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for the explanation of such sharp 
fluctuation, which mainly comes from big mergers and acquisition in developed world (see 
UNCTAD 2003 and 2008 for detail).  
Figure 2(c) shows the dramatic increasing trend of ICT development in recent decades in 
DCs. In 1990, there were less than 5 persons per 100 people in DCs who had telephone or 
mobile phone services. However, this number increased rapidly to more than 55 persons per 
100 people in 2007. Finally, Figure 2(d) shows the importance of remittances to DCs vis-à-vis 
the world. The DCs’ remittance trend is not only much higher than the world, but has been 
increasing dramatically since 1995. If the unofficial flow of remittance were also included, the 
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picture would be more interesting. However, information on unofficial flow is difficult to 
explore. These trends also suggest that the significance of globalization is much higher for DCs. 
 
Figure 2 Comparative Trends of Key Elements of Globalization between DCs and the World  
(1970-2007) 
 
Source: Calculations done by the author using data from WDI online database of the World Bank 
(accessed May 5, 2010). 
2.2  Quality of Life (QOL) 
QOL, the dependent variable of this study, is also a vague term that has different meanings for 
different people. QOL is a multifaceted and elusive concept (e.g. Nussbaum and Sen 1993, 
Doyal and Gough 1991). Generally, QOL definitions emphasize degree of choice, meaning the 
greater the degree of choice, the higher the QOL. Mainly, choice is explained in economic 
terms. Thus, for many decades, national QOL measures have been defined by the level of the 
GNP per capita. Although GNP per capita is a significant part of a development strategy, it 
cannot capture all aspects of development. Of course, there is a systematic positive relationship 
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between GNP per capita and social and human welfare (McGillivray 1991), but the social and 
physiological aspect of QOL cannot be measured correctly by the income variable. Thus, a 
range of socio-economic indicators should be considered to measure QOL. For instance, it is 
estimated that economic development adds approximately 30 years to life expectancy and 
reduces infant mortality by 140 deaths per thousands live births (Sagan and Afifi, 1978). 
Additionally, the World Economic Forum’s World Competitiveness Report (WCR, 1993) also 
recognizes the importance of measuring social and economic indicators of competitiveness 
among nations, including human resources as the fifth of the 10 most important economic 
components of a nation’s environment. However, there has been no individual attempt to create 
such a composite index, as it requires massive efforts and cost.  
To cover this shortcoming, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1990) 
introduced the Human Development Index (HDI), a comprehensive measure of QOL, in 1990 
aiming to provide a yardstick of human development of all member countries of the United 
Nations. Since then, the UNDP has published the Human Development Report (HDR) annually 
for the world, and occasionally for regions and member states, in detail. The HDR’s basic 
principle is that the essential components of QOL are the combination of a long and healthy life, 
education, and a decent standard of living. As a result, the HDI has measured human 
development through the use of three factors; longevity, knowledge and GDP per capita 
measured in purchasing power parity (PPP).  
Because of its popularity and data availability for a wide range of countries since before 
1990, this study uses the HDI as an overall measure of QOL. Apart from the HDI, there are 
four other key indexes that have been reported by the HDR: the Gender Development Index 
(GDI), the Gender Empowerment Index (GEM), and the two Human Poverty Indexes for 
developing (HPI-1) and developed (HPI-2) countries. This study, however, takes the GDI and 
HPI-1 along with HDI as dependent variables. Detailed explanations and calculations 
techniques of the indexes can be found in Technical Note 1 of Human Development Report, 
2007/08 (UNDP, 2008: 356-357). 
Figure 3 presents the trends of HDI across regions from 1975 to 2005. In general, the 
HDI for highly globalized regions is much higher. However, HDI trends for less globalized 
regions also seem to be catching up. This is more valid for the East Asia & Pacific (EAP) 
region, which saw an even more rapid pace of human development from the same period and 
exceeded the global average in 2000. This was due to the region’s high and shared economic 
growth (World Bank, 1993). 
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Figure 3 Regional Comparisons of Human Development Trends (1975-2005) 
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Source: Calculations done by the author based on UNDP (2009). Updated data also available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/ (accessed in May 3, 2009). 
 
C.  Linkages between Globalization and QOL 
As was observed by the general trends of globalization and human development, it is easy to 
predict their positive relationship. Although most literature agrees that globalization is a current 
reality (Guillen 2001), the human consequences of globalization remain controversial. Two 
contradicting theories prevail in how globalization affects human welfare. First, neo-liberalists 
believe that globalization enhances productive efficiency and generates extraordinary 
prosperity. Although wages for unskilled workers fall, especially in developed nations, 
globalization helps workers manage these potential threats by acquiring additional skills, which 
benefits the whole of society (Grennes 2003). Additionally, globalization has spread 
industrialization to developing countries, and has thus reduced global income inequality 
(Firebaugh and Goesling 2004). Economic globalization, in terms of trade liberalization, was 
found to be effective in increasing productivity and institution-building in societies, which 
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leads to faster economic growth (Urata and Yokota 1994; Rodrik et al. 2004). However, many 
argue that some policy measures are essential to make globalization work for all (Mayer 2007) 
pointed out that globalization alone is not a sufficient condition for development. For example, 
trade liberalization without roads and ports would not lead to more trade or help the poor 
(Stiglitz 2004). Even though scholars point out the defects of the current form of globalization 
and suggest better options, they ultimately tend to favor globalization. 
On the contrary, many others see globalization as a new hegemonic project that 
transnational capitals operate in a way that promises little betterment for most countries. This 
perspective claims that the current form of globalization is the creation of a new world order 
that facilitates capitalist accumulation in the so-called free market environment (Petras and 
Veltmeyer 2001). Promoting private interests in a limitless free market ignores personal and 
social interests (Smart 2003). As a result, benefits from globalization primarily go mainly to the 
already advantaged (Scholte 2005).  
Within the context of these controversies, this paper attempts to answer how and which 
types of globalization generate the most favorable and unfavorable human consequences. It 
founded on the theoretical base provided by the Sirgy et al. (2004) and improves the empirical 
model offered by Tsai (2007) to evaluate the human consequences of globalization. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Most empirical analyses use cross-country data at a certain point in time (Rodrik 1988). 
Although this is useful to find differences between countries, such studies fail to observe 
changes in structural features and their correlates over time. These studies are also limited by 
fewer numbers of observations, which lead to weak results. Thus, this study builds a panel of 
124 DCs, covering nine years of annual data of globalization and human development from 
1997 to 2005. The selected countries are listed in Appendix 1. Data from 1997 onward is used 
because there is no HPI data available for years prior to 1997. 
In another analysis, Tsai (2007) used a similar methodology on panel data of 112 
developing countries. However, he had several methodological weaknesses. Firstly, the results 
were weak in capturing time effects as the data were in intervals of 10 years from 1980 to 2000. 
Secondly, Tsai uses economic, social and political globalization separately in the regression 
instead of regressing simultaneously, which can create the problem of biased, as Dreher (2006) 
argues, “The effects reported for one dimension of globalization might therefore appear only 
because other important aspects of globalization are omitted from the regressions” (p. 1092). 
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The current study corrects these shortcomings by using the components of globalization 
simultaneously with annual data. 
3.1 The Data and Its Sources 
The HDI, the GDI and the HPI-1 are the dependent variables of this study. Data are from the 
1998-2007/08 annual HDRs. The KOF indexes (sourced from the updated database of Dreher 
2006) and some key elements of globalization (sourced from the WDI online database), as 
defined in the previous section are explanatory variables. Contrary to the conventional 
approach of using proxies of globalization through specific factors such as trade and investment, 
this paper adopts a more multidimensional and pluralistic approach. A multidimensional 
approach is far more effective in preventing the over-simplification of complexities involved in 
understanding globalization. This over-simplification is usually due to the omitting of 
important variable(s) in addition to problems of measurement and interpretation (Dreher et al. 
2008: 121).  
In choosing the set of control variables, this paper follows standard practice as much as 
possible. Firstly, a country’s level of development is considered a critical element in improving 
human development (Tsai 2007). Thus, it includes per capita GDP to differentiate development 
levels across countries. Secondly, as this study focuses on developing countries, population 
growth is also included because the literature has long documented the harmful impacts of 
unchecked fertility against limited resources, such as attenuated health and educational 
expenditures, insufficient housing, sanitary and water, etc. (Goldthorpe 1996). Data of both the 
control variables are taken from the WDI online database. Finally, this study also introduces a 
dummy variable to compare the effect of globalization across different income group of 
countries. The dummy for lower middle-income countries (LMCs) and upper middle-income 
countries (UMCs) are created for comparison. The classifications are based on the World 
Bank’s classification of countries and regions (World Bank 2008). Then an interaction term is 
generated with multiplying each dummy variable and major elements of globalization and 
indexes that are used in each regression equation. Natural logarithms of all variables (except 
dummies) are taken to reduce the skewness of the data. The summary statistics of each variable 
are presented in Appendix 2. 
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3.2 The Model 
Throughout this paper, the fixed effect (FE) estimation model is used to analyze the data. The 
FE model explores the relationship between predictor and outcome variables within an entity 
(country, person, company, etc.). When using the FE model, it is assumed that something 
within the individual may impact the predictor or outcome variables, so this needs to be 
controlled for. Another important assumption of the FE model is that time-invariant 
characteristics are unique to the individual and should not be correlated with other individual 
characteristics. Each entity is different, therefore the entity’s error term and the constant (which 
captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with the others. If the error terms 
are correlated, then FE is not suitable since inferences may not be correct and that relationship 
needs to be modeled (probably by using random-effects). The Hausman test indicates that the 
dataset good fit the FE model. The model is described as follows. 
 
log Yit= α + β1 logCit + β2 logGit + ui +∈it 
 
Here, Y is the vector of dependent variables (i.e. HDI, GDI and HPI-1), C is the vector of 
control variables (i.e. GDP per capita and population growth) and G is the vector of 
explanatory variables (i.e. the indexes of globalization). α is the constant term. β is the 
coefficient of explanatory variable that explains the strength and direction of impact on QOL 
indicators. In addition, i represents the group identifier (i.e. 124 countries), and t represents the 
time identifier (i.e. 9 years from 1997 to 2005). Similarly, ui +∈it is the composite error term, 
where ui is the unobservable country effect fixed over time. Time dummies were included in the 
equation and found that the time effect is jointly significant; however, results for time dummies 
are not reported in result tables. 
A number of diagnostic tests were performed before and after running the regression in 
Stata. A unit root test for panel data developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) was performed 
that confirmed all the variables are free from the unit root problem. Similarly, tests for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticiy also showed no significant such problems on the model. 
The correlation matrix of each variable is presented in Appendix 3. 
4. RESULTS 
First, the study uses the key elements of globalization as major explanatory variables. Then, it 
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uses the KOF indexes to capture the overall effects of globalization. Table 1 shows the impacts 
of the major elements of globalization on the HDI. Column 1 reports the results without the 
interaction terms, whereas Column 2 reports the results of regression including all the 
interaction terms. The effects of trade and access to ICT were found to significantly increase 
human development at the 1 % level in both the columns. These results are consistent with 
much of the existing literature, theoretical as well as empirical, which argues that trade helps 
overall socio-economic development by increasing employment, productivity, government 
revenue, educational access and standards, among other things, all which lead to the overall 
improvement of human development (Seker, 2009; Bernard et al., 2007). Similarly, UNDP 
(2001) claims that using ICT in a development strategy allows DCs to achieve a wider diffusion 
of benefits, which ultimately leads to a broad-based economic growth. 
Table 1 Human Development and Four Major Elements of Globalization (1997-2005) 
Dependent Variable: Human Development Index (HDI) 
Notes: Fixed effect (FE) estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. * means the coefficient is 
significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. LMC=lower-middle income countries and 
UMC=Upper-middle income countries. All the variables, dependent as well as explanatory, are logged to 
neutralize the skewness of data. The data covers 1997 to 2005 annually. 
Sources: The data of GDP per capita, population growth rate, trade, FDI inflow, mobile/fixed line subscribers (as 
ICT) and remittances are taken from the WDI online database of the World Bank. HDI are taken from the HDRs 
from 1997 to 2007/08 of the UNDP.  
Impact of FDI was found to be significant at 1% only in Column 2. The finding is 
consistent with the evidence drawn by Arnal and Hijzen (2008), which suggests that the 
Explanatory Variables [1] [2] 
GDP per capita 0.02** ( 0.01) 0.04*** ( 0.01) 
Population Growth -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 
FDI Inflow (% of GDP) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02*** (0.01) 
Log of ICT 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.00) 
Log of Remittances 0.00 (0.00) 0.003 (0.003) 
LMC Dummy × Trade -- 0.03 (0.03) 
UMC Dummy × Trade -- 0.06* (0.03) 
LMC Dummy × FDI -- -0.03*** (0.01) 
UMC Dummy × FDI -- -0.03*** (0.01) 
LMC Dummy × ICT -- 0.004 (0.01) 
UMC Dummy × ICT -- -0.001 (0.01) 
LMC Dummy × Remittances -- 0.003 (0.01) 
UMC Dummy × Remittances -- -0.01** (0.01) 
Constant -0.93*** (0.08) -1.13*** (0.09) 
R -Square (Number of Observations) 0.28 (913) 0.27 (913) 
 15 
OECD based MNEs tend to provide better pay than their domestic counterparts, especially 
when they operate in developing and emerging economies. The positive impact on wages also 
appears to spread to the employees of domestic firms that ultimately uplift the QOL of 
workers in DCs.  
As for the control variables, only GDP per capita has a positive impact on human 
development. The effect was significant at the 5 % level in Column 1 and the 1 % level in 
Column 2. This result is in the line with the mainstream literature and the general intuition that 
income improves overall QOL. However, the effect of population growth was not significant.  
The results in Column 2 are firmly consistent with Column 1. The main purpose of this 
column is to observe whether the above observed effects are different in different income 
groups of countries. As the model does not include the interaction term with the dummy of low-
income countries (LICs), the positive sign of the coefficient of the interaction term of the 
respective income group reveals a larger effect than LICs and vice versa. Thus, Column 2 
reveals that the effect of FDI is significantly (at 1%) lower in lower-middle income countries 
(LMCs) and upper-middle income countries (UMCs) than LICs, as both have -0.3 coefficients. 
This is a welcoming result that the HDI promoting effect of FDI is higher in LICs, as many 
scholars worry that FDI works well only on those countries that have already reached a certain 
level of development. Regarding the trade issue, the effect on UMCs was significantly (at 10%) 
more than other groups of countries. 
In Table 2, the dependent variable is the GDI. The table reports that trade and ICT are 
significant at 1% in promoting gender development in both columns except for trade effects on 
Column 2, which is only significant at 5%. These results support the arguments that 
international trade reduces the gender gap in DCs. For example, evidence shows that job 
creation for women in export sectors are growing rapidly (UNDP 1999), and girls, who 
historically have low labor market participation rates and so have not benefited from the 
traditional network, take greater advantage of available opportunities when their society 
undergoes economic changes (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). Similarly, the impact of ICT on 
gender development is consistent with the arguments that ICT brought some benefits to the 
developing world as women are empowered with ICT access and they negotiate gender 
relations in the household and community (Kelkar and Nathan 2002).  
The remaining two elements of globalization and control variables are found to be 
insignificant in affecting the GDI. The results after using the interaction term in Column 2 are 
quite consistent with Column 1. However, the effects are not found to be different across the 
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income groups of countries except for the trade effect on LMCs, which is significantly higher 
(at 1%) than the other region. 
Table 2 Gender-Related Development and Four Major Elements of Globalization (1997-2005) 
Dependent Variable: Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) 
Explanatory Variables              [1]    [2] 
GDP per capita 0.00 ( 0.00) 0.00 ( 0.00) 
Population Growth 0.01 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.19*** (0.07) 0.01** (0.001) 
FDI Inflow (% of GDP) 0.002 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) 
Log of ICT 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 
Log of Remittances -0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02) 
LMC Dummy × Trade -- 0.67*** (0.14) 
UMC Dummy × Trade -- 0.22 (0.16) 
LMC Dummy × FDI -- -0.02 (0.06) 
UMC Dummy × FDI -- -0.02 (0.06) 
LMC Dummy × ICT -- -0.01 (0.03) 
UMC Dummy × ICT -- -0.04 (0.05) 
LMC Dummy × Remittances -- -0.05 (0.04) 
UMC Dummy × Remittances -- -0.003 (0.04) 
Constant -1.45*** (0.28) -1.75*** (0.27) 
R -Square (Number of Observations) 0.41 (913) 0.26 (913) 
Notes: Fixed effect (FE) estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. * means the coefficient is 
significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. LMC=lower-middle income countries and 
UMC=Upper-middle income countries. All the variables, dependent as well as explanatory, are logged to 
neutralize the skewness of data. The data covers 1997 to 2005 annually. 
Sources: The data of GDP per capita, population growth rate, trade, FDI inflow, mobile/fixed line subscribers (as 
ICT) and remittances are taken from the WDI online database of the World Bank. GDI are taken from the HDRs 
from 1997 to 2007/08 of the UNDP.  
Table 3 presents the impacts of the major elements of globalization on human poverty in 
developing countries (HPI-1). The poverty effect of globalization elements is broader than the 
human and gender development effects because all the four elements of globalization (trade, 
FDI, access to ICT and remittances (except in Column 1)) are found to be significant in 
decreasing human poverty at 1 %. Trade and FDI inflows are significant at 1% in both cases 
with or without the interaction terms, whereas ICT was significant at 1% in Column 2 but not 
significant in Column 1. Migration was significant at 1 % in the case with and 10% without 
interaction terms.  
These results are consistent with the positive arguments of Winters (2000) and Urata 
(2002) for trade effect, Moran (2001) for FDI effect, the World Economic Forum (2010) for 
ICT effect and Ozden and Schiff (2006) for remittance effect on poverty reduction and 
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economic growth.  
 
Table 3 Human Poverty and Four Major Elements of Globalization (1997-2005) 
Dependent variable: Human Poverty Index for Developing Countries (HPI-1) 
Explanatory Variables [1] [2] 
GDP per capita -0.13*** ( 0.3) -0.14*** ( 0.03) 
Population Growth 0.06*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 
Trade (% of GDP) -0.11*** (0.4) -0.17*** (0.05) 
FDI Inflow (% of GDP) -0.06*** (0.02) -0.09*** (0.02) 
Log of ICT -0.00 (0.001) -0.003**** (0.001) 
Log of Remittances -0.02* (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 
LMC Dummy × Trade -- 0.11 (0.09) 
UMC Dummy × Trade -- 0.08 (0.10) 
LMC Dummy × FDI -- 0.04 (0.03) 
UMC Dummy × FDI -- 0.01 (0.05) 
LMC Dummy × ICT -- 0.07*** (0.02) 
UMC Dummy × ICT -- 0.16*** (0.04) 
LMC Dummy × Remittances -- 0.02 (0.02) 
UMC Dummy × Remittances -- 0.02 (0.02) 
Constant 4.64*** (0.17) 4.58*** (0.28) 
R -Square (Number of Observations) 0.12 (798) 0.17 (798) 
Notes: Fixed effect (FE) estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. * means the coefficient is 
significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. LMC=lower-middle income countries and 
UMC=Upper-middle income countries. All the variables, dependent as well as explanatory, are logged to 
neutralize the skewness of data. The data covers 1997 to 2005 annually. 
Sources:The data of GDP per capita, population growth rate, trade, FDI inflow, mobile/fixed line subscribers (as 
ICT) and remittances are taken from the WDI online database of the World Bank. HPI-1 are taken from the HDRs 
from 1997 to 2007/08 of the UNDP.  
As expected, population growth has a poverty increasing effect at a 1% level of 
significance. However, GDP per capita was insignificant in reducing poverty.  
Column 2 reveals that there is no difference on the poverty reducing effects of 
globalization elements across income groups of countries except for ICT. It has a larger effect 
on higher income group countries and the effect is significant at the 1% level. 
In the next step, it uses the KOF indexes of globalization as major explanatory variables. 
Table 4 provides the relationship between human development and globalization in terms of the 
KOF indexes. Column [1.a] includes overall globalization with the control variables GDP per 
capita and population growth without the interaction terms with the income group dummy, 
whereas Column [1.b] includes the interaction term. In these columns in this and the next two 
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result-tables, the suffix ‘a’ is given for the result-columns without interaction terms, and suffix 
‘b’ is given for the result-columns with interaction terms.   
The results from both the columns [1.a] and [1.b] show that the overall globalization is 
highly significant (at 1%) to increase human development. However, Column [1.b] reveals that 
these effects are not different across income groups of countries. This result supports the 
theoretical proposition made by Sirgy et al. (2004) that globalization enhances human quality 
of life in many ways.  
Table 4 Human Development and Globalization (1997-2005) 
Dependent Variable: Human Development Index (HDI) 
Explanatory Variables [1.a] [1.b] [2.a] [2.b] 
GDP per capita 0.04*** ( 0.01) 0.04*** ( 0.01) 0.04*** ( 0.01) 0.04*** ( 0.01) 
Population Growth -0.01** (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) 
Overall Globalization (G.) 0.18*** (0.02)  0.16*** (0.03)  .. .. 
Economic G. .. .. 0.07***(0.02)  0.10***(0.03)  
Social G. .. .. 0.06*** (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 
Political G. .. .. 0.08*** (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 
LMC × Overall G. .. 0.06 (0.04) .. .. 
UMC × Overall G. .. 0.01 (0.07) .. .. 
LMC × Economic G. .. .. .. -0.08* (0.04) 
UMC × Economic G. .. .. .. 0.03 (0.06) 
LMC × Social G. .. .. .. 0.1** (0.04) 
UMC × Social G. .. .. .. 0.07 (0.08) 
LMC × Political G. .. .. .. 0.04 (0.03) 
UMC × Political G. .. .. .. -0.03 (0.05) 
Constant -1.51*** (0.08) -1.52*** (0.09) -1.45*** (0.11) -1.61*** (0.10) 
R-Square (No. of obs.) 0.16 (987) 0.16 (987) 0.20 (791) 0.21 (791) 
Notes: Fixed effect (FE) estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. * means the coefficient is 
significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. LMC=lower-middle income countries and 
UMC=Upper-middle income countries. All the variables, dependent as well as explanatory, are logged to 
neutralize the skewness of data. The data covers 1997 to 2005 annually. Column (2) has fewer observations 
because some particular types of globalization data are not reported for some countries. 
Sources: Globalization indexes are taken from Dreher (2006), GDP per capita (current US$) and population 
growth rates are from the WDI online database of the World Bank, and HDI are from the HDR from 1997 to 
2007/08 of the UNDP.  
As expected, GDP per capita has a significant (at 1%) positive impact on HDI since 
GDP per capita itself is one of the three components of HDI, which generates a direct effect on 
it. Additionally, as richer countries generally have better health and educational status, GDP per 
capita also indirectly generates a positive effect on HDI. Similarly, it is quite natural to observe 
the negative impact of population growth on HDI. These impacts are significant at the 5% level. 
This result is consistent with the previous findings that higher population growth rates have 
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negative correlations with economic growth, health and educational indicators, particularly in 
developing countries (e.g. Kelly and Schmitd, 1995).  
In Columns [2.a] and [2.b], instead of overall globalization, the three sub-indexes 
economic, social and political globalization, are included in the equation. Such disaggregated 
analyses not only demonstrate the independent effect of each dimension of globalization, but 
also cross-checks the validity of the model based on the consistency of the results. Here, the 
result is highly consistent with Column [1.a] and Column [1.b]. All the three dimensions of 
globalization; economic, social and political, were found to be highly significant at the 1% 
level to increase human development in both the equations with or without the interaction term, 
except for the social and political globalization in Column 2.b in which the effect were found 
significant at 10%. Interestingly, the magnitude and direction of the effect of GDP per capita 
and population growth were also found to be exactly the same as in the previous columns [1.a] 
and [1.b]. These findings are similar with the outcomes of an empirical analysis by Tsai (2007), 
but the relationship that he found was rather poor; Tsai showed the significance level of the 
overall impact of globalization on human development at 10 % and also reported no significant 
impact of economic and social globalization.  
Unlike the case of overall globalization, the results from the disaggregated analysis shows 
that the human development effect of economic globalization was significantly (at 10%) lower 
in LMCs than LICs. However, there is no difference in effects between LICs and UMCs. 
However, social globalization has a significantly (at 5%) larger effect on LMCs. This indicates 
that a certain level of development helps to optimize the benefits from social globalization. 
Similarly, Table 5 presents the effects of globalization on GDI. Column [1.a] shows that 
the effect of overall globalization was positively significant (at 1%), which reveals that 
globalization also helps to reduce gender disparity in human development. The result with the 
interaction term in Column [1.b] also shows a significant (at 5%) effect. These results are 
consistent with recent findings by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), who argue that lower-caste 
girls in the Indian city of Bombay are taking full advantage of opportunities provided by the 
globalized economy switching rapidly to English schools, whereas working class boys in the 
lower caste, who already have a dominating role within their ethnic group tend to continue to 
go local language schools that lead to traditional occupations with lower incomes. Furthermore, 
these results also support the cross-country evidence of Oostendorp (2004) that shows the 
significant impact of trade and FDI net inflows on narrowing the occupational gender wage gap 
for low-skill occupations worldwide. 
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Regarding the control variables, GDP per capita has a significantly (at 1%) positive 
impact on GDI for both the columns. As expected, population growth was found significant (at 
5%) to reduce gender development, although there was no significant effect observed in 
Column [1.a]. All the effects are found no different across the income group of countries. 
Table 5 Gender-Related Development and Globalization (1997-2005) 
Dependent Variable: Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) 
Explanatory Variables [1.a] [1.b] [2.a] [2.b] 
GDP per capita 0.10***( 0.04) 0.10*** ( 0.04) 0.13***( 0.05) 0.13*** ( 0.05) 
Population Growth -0.01 (0.03) -0.01** (0.03) -0.001 (0.04) -0.001 (0.04) 
Overall Globalization (G.) 0.33*** (0.11)  0.28** (0.14)  .. .. 
Economic G. .. .. 0.39*** (0.11)  0.11*(0.16)  
Social G. .. .. -0.05 (0.11)  0.09 (0.14) 
Political G. .. .. -0.01 (0.09) 0.05 (0.14) 
LMC × Overall G. .. 0.23 (0.23) .. .. 
UMC × Overall G. .. -0.31 (0.38) .. .. 
LMC × Economic G. .. .. .. 0.82*** (0.25) 
UMC × Economic G. .. .. .. -0.09 (0.34) 
LMC × Social G. .. .. .. -0.35 (0.24) 
UMC × Social G. .. .. .. -0.11 (0.48) 
LMC × Political G. .. .. .. -0.12 (0.18) 
UMC × Political G. .. .. .. -0.10 (0.28) 
Constant -2.5*** (0.43) -2.33*** (0.49) -2.76*** (0.50) -2.73*** (0.60) 
R-Square (No. of obs.) 0.60 (987) 0.03 (987) 0.57 (791) 0.05 (791) 
Notes: Fixed effect (FE) estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. * means the coefficient is 
significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. LMC=lower-middle income countries and 
UMC=Upper-middle income countries. All the variables, dependent as well as explanatory, are logged to 
neutralize the skewness of data. The data covers 1997 to 2005 annually. Column (2) has fewer observations 
because some particular types of globalization data are not reported for some countries. 
Sources: Globalization indexes are taken from Dreher (2006), GDP per capita (current US$) and population 
growth rates are from the WDI online database of the World Bank, and GDIare from the HDR from 1997 to 
2007/08 of the UNDP.  
The gender impact of globalization mainly comes from the economic globalization. 
Because, in Column [2.a] and [2.b], when the three major components of globalization 
regressed replacing the overall globalization, only economic globalization found significant at 
1% in Column [1.a] and 10% in Column [1.b]. Thus, it argues that globalization helps to 
increase gender-related development as well. This finding complements earlier empirical 
evidence on the gender development effects of globalization by Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2006) and Ostendorp (2004), as explained above. The effect is significantly (at 1%) higher in 
LMCs indicating that the certain level of economic development is helpful to gain gender 
impact of globalization.  
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Table 6 shows the relationship between globalization and human poverty. As expected, all 
the indexes of globalization are found to be significant (mostly at 1%) in reducing poverty, as 
the coefficient of each indicator has a negative sign. Only in the case of Column [2.a] was the 
effect of political globalization observed at a 5% level of significance. These results are 
consistent with the findings by Dollar (2005) and many others that they found globalization has 
a positive impact on improving the lives of poor people in developing countries and areas. 
Table 6 Human Poverty and Globalization (1997-2005) 
Dependent Variable: Human Poverty Index for Developing Countries (HPI-1) 
Explanatory Variables [1.a] [1.b] [2.a] [2.b] 
GDP per capita -0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 ( 0.03) 
Population Growth 0.04** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 
Overall Globalization (G.) -0.54*** (0.07) -0.66*** (0.08)  .. .. 
Economic G. .. .. -0.19*** (0.06)  -0.22***(0.09)  
Social G. .. .. -0.23*** (0.06)  -0.25*** (0.08) 
Political G. .. .. -0.11** (0.05) -0.166*** (0.08) 
LMC × Overall G. .. 0.45*** (0.14) .. .. 
UMC × Overall G. .. -0.28 (0.26) .. .. 
LMC × Economic G. .. .. .. 0.23* (0.13) 
UMC × Economic G. .. .. .. -0.57*** (0.21) 
LMC × Social G. .. .. .. 0.04 (0.13) 
UMC × Social G. .. .. .. -0.05 (0.26) 
LMC × Political G. .. .. .. 0.12 (0.10) 
UMC × Political G. .. .. .. -0.08 (0.17) 
Constant 5.42*** (0.27) 5.48*** (0.31) 5.35*** (0.35) 5.71*** (0.35) 
R-Square (No. of obs.) 0.10 (863) 0.12 (863) 0.46 (734) 0.14 (734) 
Notes: Fixed effect (FE) estimations are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. * means the coefficient is 
significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. LMC=lower-middle income countries and 
UMC=Upper-middle income countries. All the variables, dependent as well as explanatory, are logged to 
neutralize the skewness of data. The data covers 1997 to 2005 annually. Column (2) has fewer observations 
because some particular types of globalization data are not reported for some countries. 
Sources: Globalization indexes are taken from Dreher (2006), GDP per capita (current US$) and population 
growth rates are from the WDI online database of the World Bank, and HDI are from the HDR from 1997 to 
2007/08 of the UNDP.  
Regarding the control variables, contrary to case of the GDI, GDP per capita was found 
to be insignificant, whereas population growth was found to increase poverty significantly at 
the 5% level. The results are consistent with all four columns. These findings demonstrate the 
fact that income growth is highly concentrated on higher-income groups among the DCs, thus 
doing little to help poor people. Population growth rates, being mostly higher among lower-
income groups and in poorer countries, certainly add a burden to the poor and ultimately 
exacerbate poverty. 
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To compare the poverty effect of globalization across different groups of countries, 
overall globalization was found to have a significantly high impact on LMCs. This clearly 
shows that countries should reach a certain level of development to capture the optimum 
poverty effect of globalization. The result is thus consistent with the argument of Sabi (2007) 
that globalization is important for human development only after certain level of income 
growth. This result actually comes from economic globalization as Column [2.b] shows that 
economic globalization has a significantly high impact on LMCs (at 10%) but a low impact on 
UMCs (at 1%), and the effect of social and political globalization are not different across 
income groups of countries. 
Overall, it is argued that globalization, in terms of the KOF index, is statistically 
significant not only in increasing human development and gender development, but also in 
reducing human poverty. Even for the segregated index of globalization (i.e. economic, social 
and political globalization), the results are generally robust. The results are consistent with the 
analysis using some of the key elements of globalization instead of globalization indexes at the 
beginning of this section, which further strengthen the reliability of the mode used in this study. 
Thus, the dataset used and model applied in this study is valid and appropriate. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In the context of disputing arguments among scholars, the empirical results of this study reveal 
that globalization enhances QOL by promoting human and gender-related development and 
significantly reducing human poverty. Not only the key elements of globalization, but the KOF 
indexes are highly significant regarding all three dependent variables of QOL (i.e. HDI, GDI 
and HPI-1) and have been shown to be quite robust in the FE regression model. Not 
surprisingly, all of the aspects of globalization (economic, social and political) contribute to the 
overall effect. Indeed, these three factors of globalization comprise a tripod of global 
integration and move along together rather than separately. Furthermore, the selected key 
elements of globalization were also found to significantly and positively affect the QOL 
indicators. This rather conventional approach gives further evidence of the validity and 
credibility of the data used and the methodology followed in this research. Therefore, it is 
argued that along with the results, the methodology applied in this study is also useful for 
similar research of this kind.  
The major message of the findings is that there should not be any fear of globalization, in 
general. It argues that globalization has mostly favorable effects for all. However, globalization 
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effects were found higher in LMCs in general. Thus, the international community should focus 
their support to LICs to empower them to raise their income level up to a certain level. 
The study also observed some unexpected outcomes. Political and social globalization, 
FDI, and international migration (proxy by remittances) were all found to be insignificant 
factors of gender-related development. Thus, how can these variables be made to significantly 
promote gender aspects of development? This is a crucial question for policymakers and the 
right answers will enhance their capacity for successful globalization because there is no choice 
but for globalization to improve QOL and other kinds of development. Indeed, better policies 
will matter in making every element significant in this process. The paper suggests further 
research for such policy recommendations. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix-1 List of developing countries included in the study (in alphabetical order) 
1. Albania  
2. Algeria  
3. Angola  
4. Argentina  
5. Armenia  
6. Azerbaijan  
7. Bangladesh  
8. Belarus  
9. Belize  
10. Benin  
11. Bhutan  
12. Bolivia  
13. Botswana  
14. Brazil  
15. Bulgaria  
16. Burkina Faso  
17. Burundi  
18. Cambodia  
19. Cameroon  
20. Cape Verde  
21. Central African 
Republic  
22. Chad  
23. Chile  
24. China  
25. Colombia  
26. Comoros 
27. Congo  
28. Congo Rep.  
29. Costa Rica 
30. Cote d’Ivoire  
31. Croatia  
32. Djibouti  
33. Dominica  
34. Dominican Republic  
35. Ecuador  
36. Egypt  
37. El Salvador  
38. Eritrea  
39. Ethiopia  
40. Fiji  
41. Gabon  
42. Gambia  
43. Georgia  
44. Ghana  
45. Grenada  
46. Guatemala  
47. Guinea  
48. Guinea-Bissau  
49. Guyana  
50. Haiti  
51. Honduras  
52. India  
53. Indonesia  
54. Iran   
55. Jamaica  
56. Jordan  
57. Kazakhstan  
58. Kenya   
59. Kyrgyzstan  
60. Lao PDR  
61. Latvia  
62. Lebanon  
63. Lesotho  
64. Libya  
65. Lithuania  
66. Macedonia  
67. Madagascar  
68. Malawi  
69. Malaysia  
70. Maldives  
71. Mali  
72. Mauritania  
73. Mauritius  
74. Mexico  
75. Moldova  
76. Mongolia  
77. Morocco  
78. Mozambique  
79. Namibia  
80. Nepal  
81. Nicaragua  
82. Niger  
83. Nigeria  
84. Pakistan  
85. Panama  
86. Papua New Guinea  
87. Paraguay  
88. Peru  
89. Philippines  
90. Poland  
91. Romania  
92. Russia  
93. Rwanda  
94. Saint Kitts  
95. Saint Lucia  
96. Saint Vincent  
97. Senegal  
98. Seychelles  
99. Sierra Leone  
100. Solomon Islands  
101. South Africa  
102. Sri-Lanka  
103. Sudan  
104. Suriname  
105. Swaziland  
106. Syria  
107. Tajikistan  
108. Tanzania  
109. Thailand  
110. Togo  
111. Tonga  
112. Tunisia  
113. Turkey  
114. Uganda  
115. Ukraine  
116. Uruguay  
117. Uzbekistan  
118. Vanuatu  
119. Venezuela  
120. Vietnam  
121. West Samoa  
122. Yemen  
123. Zambia  
124. Zimbabwe 
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Appendix-2 Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Human Development Index (HDI) 1116 0.630986 0.156687 0.25 0.87 
Gender-related Development Index 
(GDI) 1116 1.166219 17.94408 0.24 600 
Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) 869 28.9441 15.40484 3.3 65.5 
GDP per capita 1116 1810.893 1846.233 81.58 8931.87 
Population Growth 1116 1.630654 1.241132 -2.76 9.76 
Trade 1116 81.6509 38.33903 15.84 224.89 
FDI 1116 31.18571 32.31529 -16.59 202.3 
ICT 1116 19.93576 22.86311 0.04 150.97 
Migration (remittances) 1053 4.391168 6.358951 0 44.3 
Economic Globalization 909 52.25267 13.77251 17.64 84.6 
Social Globalization 1116 45.58204 17.30288 8.56 89.69 
Political Globalization 1116 57.10932 19.85124 19.1 93.6 
Overall Globalization 1116 50.39887 12.60756 20.82 80.02 
Appendix-3 Correlation Matrix 
Variables HDI GDI HPI-1 gdppc pgrow trade fdi ict remit 
HDI 1         
GDI -0.0193 1        
HPI-1 -0.9518 0.0169 1       
GDP per capita 
(gdppc) -0.1824 -0.0148 0.1932 1      
Population Growth  
(pgrow) 0.1352 -0.0297 -0.1413 -0.4296 1     
Trade 0.0815 -0.03 -0.118 0.0942 -0.2033 1    
FDI -0.0811 -0.0318 0.0402 0.1023 -0.1903 0.5246 1   
ICT -0.1265 -0.0019 0.1383 0.7641 -0.4592 0.1978 0.1772 1  
remittances -0.1299 -0.0089 0.0868 -0.137 -0.1185 0.267 0.1416 0.0366 1 
Economic G. (ecog) -0.1351 -0.0161 0.1217 0.562 -0.4011 0.5077 0.5713 0.5689 0.1147 
Social G. (socg) -0.1128 -0.0237 0.0913 0.6426 -0.4293 0.4227 0.2998 0.6111 0.1649 
Political G. (polg) -0.125 0.0615 0.1382 0.2971 -0.2511 -0.3154 -0.2073 0.3546 -0.1369 
Overall G. (ovlg) -0.1725 0.0006 0.1564 0.7079 -0.5034 0.3607 0.3898 0.7136 0.1099 
 ecog socg polg ovlg      
Economic G. (ecog) 1         
Social G. (socg) 0.6711 1        
Political G. (polg) 0.0663 0.1046 1       
Overall G. (ovlg) 0.8502 0.8543 0.4247 1      
 
 
